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The use of specialized single-level networks in current military operations is 
inadequate to meet the need to share information envisioned by the Global Information 
Grid (GIG).  Multilevel security (MLS) is a key Information Assurance enabler for the 
GIG vision.  The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), a distributed MLS network, 
eliminates the need to use separate equipment to connect to many networks at different 
classification levels.  It allows users to view data at different sensitivities simultaneously.  
MYSEA also allows commercial software and hardware to be used at clients. 
To address the threat of residual data on the client after a user session change in 
security state, the MYSEA clients are required to be “stateless”, i.e., there is no non-
volatile writable memory.  Hence the MYSEA server must provide the clients with the 
ability to execute server-resident client-side applications to access data at different 
security levels over the MLS Local Area Network (LAN).  The MYSEA server currently 
does not support such capability.  This thesis addresses this limitation.  A new trusted 
process family is introduced to provide a pseudo-socket interface for the single level 
remote application to access the MLS LAN interface.  Detailed design specifications 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION FOR STUDY 
Currently, multiple networks running at different security levels must be used to 
protect information with different classifications.  To view data at different classification 
levels, it is necessary to have separate equipment to connect to all different networks, or 
to move data from the lower classification levels to the highest level network.  The 
multilevel security (MLS) paradigm eliminates the need for maintaining specialized 
networks. 
The vision of the Global Information Grid (GIG) is to provide a globally 
interconnected network-centric information environment in order to afford information 
superiority to the warfighter [1].  This network will require a high-level of information 
assurance to protect information with different classifications.  This information needs to 
continue to be protected as it is sent remotely to the warfighter in the battlefield.  The use 
of MLS in the GIG is also more efficient than using specialized networks running at 
different security levels. 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) MLS network is currently being 
developed to provide a high assurance system that enforces multilevel security policies.  
The design includes a limited but sufficient number of high-assurance elements and 
commercial low-assurance elements.  The protection mechanisms ensure that users can 
only access information that they are currently authorized to access.  It also allows 
commercial software and hardware to be used at clients, thus making available to users 
the unmodified computing functionalities to which they are accustomed. [2] 
However, not all the requirements necessary for the MYSEA MLS network have 
currently been met.  There is a need for MYSEA clients to have the capability to run 
remote client-side applications on the MYSEA MLS server over the MYSEA MLS Local 
Area Network (LAN).  This remote application support is necessary to allow “stateless” 





The objective of this research was to complete a detailed design for the remote 
application support.  Detailed design specifications, based on the pre-existing MLS LAN 
design developed in previous work, were produced.  In addition, a sketch of a testing 
methodology using the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) client program was 
investigated. 
A number of criteria were considered when designing the remote application 
support.  The remote application services had to be decomposed into well-defined 
modules.  The design would undergo extensive reviews by the MYSEA engineering 
team.  The amount of trusted code necessary for the support was to be only what is 
necessary and sufficient for the remote application support to function.  The remote 
application support would allow the remote application to be used with a limited number 
of changes. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I gives a brief introduction to the 
project including a brief MYSEA introduction, the high level objective of this work, and 
the motivation behind this research.  Chapter II provides the background for this work.  
This includes a description of the MYSEA architecture, an overview of the existing 
MYSEA design and information on XTS-400 restrictions and features that affect the 
design.  Chapter III describes the overall concept of how the remote application support 
will operate.  It also defines the functional requirements that the design must satisfy.  
Chapter IV describes how the remote application support was designed and how the new 
components interact with the pre-existing ones.  Chapter V provides some possible 
enhancements which could be added to the design and some suggestions for 
implementation and testing.  It then concludes with a few final thoughts on the project.  




This chapter contains background information on the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA), the pre-existing modules in the Multilevel Security (MLS) Local 
Area Network (LAN) design and the XTS-400. 
B. MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (MYSEA) 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) provides a distributed network 
architecture which includes a limited but sufficient number of high-assurance elements 
for enforcing multilevel security policies.  The majority of the components come from 
low-assurance commercial elements.  The architecture consists of three main 
components: MYSEA Servers, MYSEA Clients and pre-existing single level networks.  
The MYSEA server and MYSEA clients co-exist on an MLS Local Area Network (LAN) 
[2]. 
1. MYSEA Server 
The MYSEA server runs on a DigitalNet XTS-400 Trusted Computer System and 
includes both a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and untrusted policy-aware Application 
Protocol Servers (APS).  The DigitalNet Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP), 
which enforces multilevel security policies, forms the basis of the TCB.  The 
functionality of the XTS-400 TCB has been extended to include multilevel trusted path 
services and multilevel secure session services.  The trusted path services are used to 
support trusted remote authentication by providing a trusted mechanism for 
communication between the client and the server.  The secure session services are used to 
start untrusted APSs and client-side remote applications.  The secure session services 
assign the APSs and RAs the security level that has been negotiated through the trusted 
path service mechanism. 
The trusted path services and secure session services are currently provided by the 
Trusted Path Server (TPS) and Secure Session Server (SSS) respectively.  More detail on 
both of these servers and the APS can be found in Section D below. 
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2. MYSEA Client 
MYSEA clients are untrusted commercial-off-the-shelf personnel computers.  
Since the intent is for users to be able to log into the server at different security levels, the 
clients must be stateless in order ensure that object reuse requirements are met, i.e. that 
no information related to the previous security level remains on the untrusted PC.  The 
operating system and applications are loaded into volatile RAM from a non-writeable 
source with user preferences stored on the MYSEA server.  The client connects to the 
MYSEA server using a Trusted Path Extension (TPE) located at each client.  The TPE 
provides a secure unforgettable connection between the MYSEA client and server which 
does not depend upon the security of the MYSEA clients. 
The network interface on the server connected to the MYSEA clients is 
configured to the level of the MLS LAN.  This means that any process running on the 
server that requires access to this network interface will also have to run at the level of 
the MLS LAN.  The pre-existing processes that need to run at this level include the TPS 
Parent Process, the TPS Child Process, the SSS Parent Process and the SSS Child 
Process.  The TRSS Parent and Child Processes described in Chapter IV will also need to 
run at this level. 
3. Single Level Networks 
Pre-existing single level networks operating at different security levels are 
connected to the MYSEA server either through a separate single level network interface 
or via a multilevel interface.  In the first case, a Trusted Channel Module (TCM) is used 
to provide a secure connection between the MYSEA server and multiple single level 
networks.  In addition, high assurance encryption devices can also be used, if required.  
In the future, users on single level networks will have access to content on the MYSEA 
server and MYSEA clients will have access to content on the single level networks 
without the use of middleware web portal services. 
C. XTS-400 SPECIFICS 
Information on the XTS-400 can be found in a number of references including a 
trusted facility manual [3], a programmer’s guide [4] and a user’s manual [5].  This 
section discusses some of the XTS-400 specifics which affect the design specification. 
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1. TCP/IP Privileged Ports 
The XTS-400 restricts normal user programs from using TCP/IP privileged ports.  
Only processes whose process identifier equals the network user identifier can use these 
privileged ports.  Only trusted processes may be given the privilege to change the user 
identifier on the XTS-400 system [3]. 
This restriction greatly influenced the design of the MYSEA server software.  
Trusted processes were introduced to service TCP/IP privileged ports on behalf of the 
APS and RA Processes.  This is because the APSs and RAs execute at the session level of 
the logged in TPE and do not have the privilege to change the user identifier, they cannot 
use privileged ports directly.  Allowing the APSs and RAs to change user identifiers 
would require them all to be trusted processes which would increase the amount of 
trusted code necessary on the system. 
2. Trusted and Untrusted Processes 
Trusted processes on the XTS-400 are able to manipulate Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB) databases or have privileges which exempt the process from access control 
rules [3]. 
The MYSEA server design utilizes these XTS-400 features in order to implement 
the MYSEA-specific confidentiality and integrity security policies.  The SSD, the SSS 
and the TPS are all trusted processes since they require specific privileges which are 
listed in the process Section D below.  The Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) will 
also need to be a trusted process as described in Chapter IV. 
3. System Calls 
Many of the standard Linux calls are available on the XTS-400 and can be used 
by programs running that are hierarchically dependent on the STOP.  There are also 
XTS-400 specific system calls and some of these are only available to trusted processes.  
The Privileges Module, described in Section D, uses some of the XTS-400 specific calls 
that can only be used by trusted processes to change privileges.  In addition, some system 
calls have additional functionality when called by a trusted process.  For example, a 
system call which reads an object may provide the ability to read objects at different 
security levels when invoked by trusted processes [4]. 
 
6 
D. PRE-EXISTING DESIGN SPECIFICATION/IMPLEMENTATION 
Many of the modules in the pre-existing design originated from the work done by 
BryerJoyner and Heller [6].  Their work contains the requirements, design and 
implementation for the original User Identification and Authentication, Buffer IO, 
Semaphore, Privileges, Shared Memory, Utility, Pseudo-Socket (PSKT), Trusted Path 
Server (TPS) and Secure Session Server (SSS) modules.  These modules have all been 
changed, expanded and redesigned multiple times.  The changes were reflected in an 
updated design specification draft [7].  The draft also added the Allowed Protocols, 
Allowed Trusted Path Extension (TPE), PSKT Map, User and Secure Session Daemon 
(SSD) modules.  The most recent version of the design specification includes the new 
design for client-side remote application support and additional details on the pre-existing 
modules.  The remainder of this section reviews the high-level details of the various pre-
existing modules. 
1. Overview 
The diagram below depicts the sequence of events that take place when a user 




Figure 1.   Pre-Existing Design Overview 
 
The TPS family of processes, including the TPS Parent and TPS Child, is trusted.  
The TPS Child Process requires the privilege to access system identification and 
authentication information. 
The SSS family of processes, including the SSD, the SSS Parent and SSS Child, 
is also trusted.  The privilege set for this family of processes includes the ability to 
change the user identifier of the process and MAC/DAC exemption.  Both privileges are 
invoked by the SSD Process to cleanup up any left over PSKT Databases during startup 
that could be at any user/session level.  The SSS Child Process invokes both privileges to 
create the PSKT Database used for communications between the SSS Child Process and 
APS Process.  The SSS Child Process also invokes the MAC/DAC exemption privilege 
to access the PSKT Database since the SSS Child Process normally runs at the level of 
the MLS LAN, which allows access to the network interface card. 
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When the MYSEA server starts, the TPS Parent Process and SSD begin 
execution.  After initialization the TPS Parent Process waits for trusted path connection 
requests.  The SSD creates a SSS Parent Process to handle connection requests for each 
protocol server to be run on the MYSEA server. 
When the user desires to access one of the application servers, the user must first 
invoke the Secure Attention Key on the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) device, which 
establishes a secure connection with the server.  The TPE is then used to login to the 
MLS server by entering a user name and password in response to prompts issued by the 
server.  A TPS Child Process is created and it uses its privilege to access system 
identification and authentication information to verify the user name and password.  Still 
using the TPE, the user then chooses an initial session level.  The session is finally started 
by issuing the run command on the TPE device.  After the session-level connection 
between the MLS server and TPE is established, the client system is permitted to send 
data to and receive information from the server via the TPE. 
The client can now, for instance, send a request for a web page to the MYSEA 
server.  The SSS Parent Process receives this request and starts an SSS Child Process to 
receive further http protocol requests from the client.  The SSS Child Process uses its 
privileges to create a PSKT Database to be used for communications between the SSS 
Child Process and the HTTP server (httpd).  The SSS Child Process starts an httpd to 
handle the HTTP request.  The httpd process communicates the results of the request 
back to the client via the SSS Child Process using the PSKT Database. 
2. Databases 
The following databases were initially designed to store the data used by the TPS 
and SSS: Allowed TPE Database, User Database, Allowed Protocols Database, PSKT 
Map Database and PSKT Database.  The diagram below depicts which databases are used 
by which process during runtime.  The type of access (read and/or write) is also included 












a. Allowed Trusted Path Extension (TPE) Database 
The Allowed Trusted Path Extension (TPE) Database contains a list of 
unique identifiers of authorized TPEs.  The database is statically configured by an 
administrator before starting the MYSEA server.  The TPS Parent Process uses this 
database to determine if a TPE is allowed to login to the system. 
b. User Database 
The User Database is used to keep track of the TPEs that are currently 
logged into a system.  Entries in the database are dynamically updated during runtime.  
Each entry in the database associates a TPE identifier to the user identifier logged in from 
that TPE and the session level of the login. 
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The TPS Child Process has read/write access to the database.  When a user 
logs into the MLS LAN from a TPE, the TPS Child Process adds an entry to the database.  
The session level is updated if the user changes session levels.  The TPS Child Process 
also removes the entry from the database when the user logs out of the system. 
The SSS Parent Process has read access to the database.  The SSS Parent 
Process uses the database to determine the user identifier and session level logged in from 
a TPE when the process receives a protocol connection request. 
c. Allowed Protocols Database 
The Allowed Protocols Database contains a list of application protocols 
that are started by the MLS server during startup.  The database is statically configured 
by an administrator before starting the MYSEA server.  Each entry in the database 
contains an identifier for the protocol, the port number used for listening to requests and a 
path to the executable for the service.  The SSD uses this database during startup to 
determine which protocols need to be supported.  The SSD starts a SSS Parent Process 
for each protocol in the database. 
d. Pseudo-Socket (PSKT) Map Database 
The Pseudo-Socket (PSKT) Map Database maps a user ID and session 
level to a shared memory key which is used to find the shared memory segment that 
contains a Pseudo-Socket Database.  Entries in the database are dynamically updated 
during runtime.  The entries keep track of which shared memory locations are being used 
for communications between different SSS Child Process and Application Protocol 
Server (APS) Process pairs. 
In the original design, the SSS Child Process had read/write access to the 
database.  When an SSS Child Process was started to handle protocol server requests 
from a TPE, the SSS Child Process would reserve a PSKT handle in the database by 
assigning a handle to a user ID/session level.  This handle would then be used to create a 
PSKT Database for communications between the SSS Child Process and APS Process 
pairs.  The changes made in the new design can be found in Section G of Chapter IV. 
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The APS Processes also have read access to the database.  An APS 
Process uses the database to determine the shared memory key of the PSKT Database that 
it will use for communications with the appropriate SSS Child Process that provides 
access to the network interface card. 
Locking is used to ensure exclusive access to the database when a PSKT 
handle is allocated.  This prevents the possible allocation of one PSKT handle to more 
than one SSS Child Process. 
e. Pseudo-Socket (PSKT) Database 
The Pseudo-Socket (PSKT) Database provides the communications 
interface between each SSS Child Process and APS Process pair.  Entries in the database 
are dynamically updated during runtime.  Each entry in the database includes a SSS Child 
Process identifier, APS Process identifier, network address of the client workstation, 
network address of the server, an in use flag field, a APS status field and two buffers.  
The in use flag marks entries in the database that are currently being used by a SSS Child 
Process/APS Process pair.  The APS status field keeps track of whether the entry is 
currently initializing, done or ready.  The two buffers are circular buffers used to pass the 
data stream between processes.  One is used to pass the data stream from the server to the 
client and the other is used to pass the data stream from the client to the server. 
The SSS Child Processes and APS Processes have read/write access to the 
database.  When the SSS Child Process receives data from the client on a socket, the data 
is written into the client to server buffer.  The APS Process then retrieves the data from 
the buffer for use by the APS.  Output data from the APS is written into the server to 
client buffer.  The SSS Child Process then reads the data in the buffer and sends the data 
to the client through the socket. 
Locking is used to ensure exclusive access to the database during 
allocation of an entry in the database.  This prevents the possible allocation of a PSKT to 





f. Database Initialization 
The table below summarizes the existing databases and the processes that 
are responsible to initialize those databases.  New databases introduced in the new design 
are summarized in Chapter IV.  It also states which databases are statically configured 
and which use shared memory. 
 
 




Allowed Protocols SSD System-Wide 
(once on system 
startup) 
Y N 
Allowed Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE) 
TPS Parent System-Wide Y N 
PSKT SSS Child Per TPE User/ 
Session (every 
time a user/session 
is established) 
N Y 
PSKT Map SSD System-Wide N N 
User TPS Parent System-Wide N Y 
 
Table 1. Database Initialization 
 
Shared memory is used only for databases that are accessed by multiple 
processes.  The two statically configured databases (Allowed Protocols Database and 
Allowed TPE Database) do not use shared memory.  They are both read from files into 
memory by the process listed in the table.  The PSKT Map Database is a runtime 
database which currently uses a shared flat file for implementation instead of shared 
memory.  The PSKT Database and User Database are both runtime databases that use 
shared memory.  The initialization of the Pseudo-Socket Map Database has been changed 
in the new design as discussed in Chapter IV. 
3. Processes 
a. Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent Process 
The Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent Process runs during the startup of 
the MLS server as a system daemon.  The TPS Parent Process determines whether each 
trusted path connection received from the TPE will be accepted.  When the TPS Parent 
Process receives a trusted path connection, it checks for the TPE identifier in the Allowed 
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TPE Database.  The TPS Parent Process forks a TPS Child Process to handle the 
connection if the Allowed TPE Database contains the TPE identifier.  The TPS Parent 
Process must run at the level of the MLS LAN since it requires access to the network 
interface card. 
b. TPS Child Process 
The TPS Child Process takes over the trusted path connection once the 
TPS Parent Process has accepted the connection.  The child handles all trusted path 
communications from the TPE including login, change session level, run and logout.  
When the TPS Child receives data from the client on the connection, the process first 
checks to ensure that the data is a Secure Attention Request Packet (SARP).  The TPS 
Child then reads and processes the command.  The output is sent back to the client on the 
connection.  The TPS Child requires the privilege to access system identification and 
authentication information and uses the User Identification and Authentication Module to 
verify a username and password.  The TPS Child Process also runs at the level of the 
MLS LAN.  The TPS Child Process maintains the information in the User Database by 
associating each logged in TPE identifier with the user ID/session level. 
c. Secure Session Daemon (SSD) 
The Secure Session Daemon (SSD) is another process that runs during 
startup of the MLS server as a system daemon.  The SSD reads in the static Allowed 
Protocols Database from a file and uses the execution path in each entry to start a SSS 
Parent Process for each protocol found in the database.  The SSD must run at the level of 
the MLS LAN since the child it creates must run at that level in order to access the MLS 
LAN. 
In the pre-existing design, the SSD requires privileges to: 1) read/write all 
secret and integrity levels, 2) bypass discretionary access checking and 3) change its user 
identifier.  These privileges allow the SSD to clean up any left over PSKT Databases that 
could be at any user/session level.  However, this function has been moved to the TPS 
Parent Process as described in Chapter IV. 
d. Secure Session Server (SSS) Parent Process 
The Secure Session Server (SSS) Parent Process validates any requests 
received from clients for services offered by APSs.  When the SSS Parent Process 
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receives a request, it first determines if the request was received from a valid TPE by 
verifying that the TPE is in the User Database.  In the new design described in Chapter 
IV, the SSS Parent also checks for a valid remote connection in the Remote Connection 
Database if the TPE cannot be found.  If a valid session or valid remote connection is 
found, the SSS Parent process forks a SSS Child Process to handle additional requests on 
the connection.  Otherwise, the connection is terminated. 
The SSS Parent Process must run at the level of the MLS LAN since it 
requires access to the network interface card.  The SSS Parent Process requires the XTS-
400 privilege to change the user identifier to the network user identifier to access 
restricted ports. 
e. SSS Child Process 
The Secure Session Server (SSS) Child Process creates an APS Process to 
service the client.  The SSS Child Process then passes data between the client and the 
APS.  Any data received on the socket is passed to the APS through using the PSKT 
Database.  Any data placed in the PSKT Database by the APS is sent out on the socket by 
the SSS Child. 
The SSS Child Process also runs at the level of the MLS LAN, and 
requires the MAC/DAC exemption and user identifier change privileges.  The SSS Child 
Process normally runs at the level of the MLS LAN to access the network interface card, 
but it also needs to be able to access the PSKT Database being used for communications 
with the APS.  In order to do this, the SSS Child Process must be exempt from 
MAC/DAC restrictions.  The SSS Child Process also initializes the PSKT Database.  This 
database is created at a specific user ID/session level which requires a change in user 
identifier in addition to the MAC/DAC exemption. 
f. Application Protocol Server (APS) 
Each Application Protocol Server (APS) handles the server side of a 
client/server protocol.  These servers are untrusted and must use the PSKT interfaces to 
communicate with the socket connected to the client via the SSS Child Process.  The 
source code of each server needs to be modified to use the PSKT interface.  The handle 
needed to attach to the shared memory is retrieved from the PSKT Map Database. 
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A number of APSs have already been prototyped in other works.  These 
include an Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) mail server [8] which was 
examined again [9], a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) mail server, Sendmail [10] 
and a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) web server [11]. 
4. Other Modules 
a. Semaphore 
The Semaphore Module provides interfaces used to lock various 
databases.  When a database is initialized, a semaphore is created for the module that 
manages the database.  The semaphore identifier is opened by each additional process 
that accesses the same database.  The PSKT Map Module and the PSKT Module depend 
on this module.  The following new modules described in Chapter IV also depend on this 
module for locking: Remote Connection Module, Remote Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) 
Map Module, RAPSKT Module and Cleanup Module. 
b. User Identification and Authentication 
The User Identification and Authentication Module manages access to 
user identification and authentication functions provided by the XTS-400.  The two 
interfaces included are used by the TPS Child Processes.  The first allows the TPS Child 
Process to determine if a username and password sent via the TPE are valid.  The second 
allows the TPS Child to determine if the username/session level pair is valid. 
c. Buffer IO 
The Buffer IO Module is used to manage a circular buffer.  The PSKT 
Module depends on this module to manage the two buffers included in each entry of the 
database. 
d. Privileges 
The Privileges Module manages access to privilege granting and revoking 
functions provided by the XTS-400.  Only privileges that are predetermined can be 
enabled by each process.  Interfaces are provided to disable all privileges previously 
granted and to enable each of the following privileges: 
• Read/write all secrecy and integrity levels and bypass discretionary 
access checking (MAC/DAC exemption) 
• Perform identification and authentication checking 
• Change owner/group attributes of the current process 
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• Change access class of an object 
• Change mandatory access of an object 
• Read objects with lower integrity 
The SSD, the SSS Parent and Child, the TPS Parent and Child, and the 
User Identification and Authentication Module depend on the Privileges Module.  The 
Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent and Child described in Chapter IV also 
use the module. 
e. Shared Memory 
The Shared Memory Module provides interfaces that simplify the use of 
shared memory management functions provided by the XTS-400.  The functions in the 
module allow a process to create, attach to, detach from and remove shared memory 
blocks.  When a process attaches to a database in shared memory, it uses the shared 
memory key associated with the database to retrieve a pointer to a database in shared 
memory that has already been initialized.  A process detaches to release the shared 
memory resources which are still being used by other processes.  The User Module and 
PSKT Module depend on the Shared Memory Module.  The following new modules 
described in Chapter IV also depend on this module: Remote Connection Module, 
Remote Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) Map Module, RAPSKT Module, Cleanup Module, 
Peer Level Module and Source Address Binding Module. 
f. Utility 
The Utility Module contains a variety of utility functions used for 
retrieving the access class of a process, comparing two access classes to determine if a 
read or write is allowed, evaluating a test condition (similar to ‘assert’ in UNIX) and 
debugging.  All modules depend on this module except the Utility Module. 
In the next chapter, the requirements for remote application support are 
discussed and the functional requirement identified. 
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III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) server described in Chapter II 
currently does not have support to allow MYSEA thin clients to run remote applications 
on the multilevel secure (MLS) server over the MLS LAN.  The goal of the new design is 
to add the necessary secure services to provide this remote application support.  The 
remainder of this chapter discusses the concept of operations for the user and the 
requirements, constraints and dependencies that were considered during development of 
the design specification. 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
When the user desires to use an application with remote application (RA) support 
on the MLS server, the user must first invoke the secure attention key on the Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE) device, which establishes a secure connection with the server.  The TPE 
is then used to actually login to the MLS server by entering a user name and password in 
response to prompts issued by the server.  Still using the TPE, the user then chooses an 
initial session level.  The session is finally started by issuing the run command on the 
TPE device.  After the session-level connection between the MLS server and TPE is 
established, the client system is permitted to send and receive information from the server 
via the TPE.  Now that the user has access to the MLS server, a web browser may be 
opened up on the client.  A request is sent to the MLS web server to get the web page 
containing a list of RAs that can be run by the client.  One of the links displayed in the 
web browser can then be chosen to start a specific RA. 
C. TOP-LEVEL USER REQUIREMENTS 
The design of the remote application (RA) support is based on the following top-
level user requirements: 
• The RA shall be able to communicate with the local MLS server, a remote 
MLS server and a RA server. 
• The remote application shall be appropriately bound to the authenticated 
user’s session. 
• The user shall be able to launch the RA from the client. 
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• The MLS server shall be able to support both Unix/Linux and Microsoft 
Windows clients. 
• The design shall only require a minimal number of changes to the RA. 
D. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The design of the RA support places the following constraints on the user 
operations: 
• The user must use a uniform booting and login sequence as described 
above in Section B.  This sequence is necessary for the RA mechanism to 
be properly initialized. 
• The RA can only be invoked via a web interface. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions apply to the design of the RA support: 
• Applications on the MLS server have been ported to provide RA support. 
• Remote applications can only access the MLS LAN via the RAPSKT 
interface provided by the MYSEA trusted code. 
F. REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW 
1. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) 
The user logs in to the MLS server at a session level and any RAs that the user 
runs should also run at the same level.  However, as discussed in Chapter II, the XTS-400 
has privileged TCP/IP ports that can only be accessed by processes running with the 
network user identifier.  In addition, a process also needs to run at the level of the MLS 
LAN in order to access the network interface card between the MYSEA server and 
clients.  This creates the necessity for a new trusted process on the server which allows 
the RA to communicate with the network interface card and access the privileged ports.  
The name of this new process is the Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS).  The TRSS 
provides a customized programming interface to allow the RA to communicate through 
the TRSS with local MLS servers, remote MLS servers and single-level RA servers. 
To minimize the number of changes necessary to the RA implementation, the 
customized communication interface needs to allow the RA to make function calls using 
the same parameters used by the normal socket library function calls.  This new 
communications interface is called the remote application pseudo-socket (RAPSKT).  
The TRSS manages all remote application pseudo-sockets for a given TPE and ensures 
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that the RAPSKT used by an RA is associated with the correct user ID/session level pair 
for the given TPE.  The RAPSKT mechanism enables data to be passed back and forth 
between the RA Process and TRSS Process. 
The TRSS also prevents the RA from making connections to peers that do not 
have the same session level as the RA.  For each request, the TRSS needs to control 
access to peers by comparing the level of the peer with the level of the RA.  This requires 
a static configuration table containing a list of authorized peers along with corresponding 
session levels.  If the peer is another TPE, the TRSS consults the existing User Database 
instead of the static table. 
The TRSS must assign each RA connection a unique identifier associated with a 
user ID/session level.  This allows the SSS Parent to determine when an incoming 
connection request is coming from an RA. 
The TPS Child Process needs to have a means of terminating the TRSS Parent 
Process when a user logs out or changes session levels.  Therefore, a signal mechanism is 
necessary to allow asynchronous termination signals to be sent from the TPS Child 
Process to the TRSS Parent Process. 
2. Remote Application (RA) 
All remote applications must be modified to communicate with the clients via the 
RAPSKT interface.  The RA must be able to notify the TRSS when the RA needs to 
make a socket library function call.  In addition, the TRSS Process needs to be able to 
terminate the remote applications that are not closed before a user logs out of the system 
or changes session levels.  Therefore, some type of signaling mechanism is necessary for 
the RA. 
In addition, a signal mechanism is required for the RA to send signals to the 
TRSS.  However, the RA cannot use the normal signal mechanism to communicate with 
the TRSS.  The RA must run at the session level of the logged in TPE and, therefore, the 
RA is not authorized to send signals to the TRSS with the normal mechanism.  An 
alternate signal mechanism, discussed in Chapter IV, must be designed to handle this 
. 
20 
To satisfy the need for the MLS server to support both Unix/Linux and Microsoft 
Windows clients and allow the user to launch RAs from the client, a web browser can be 
used to present the user with a list of possible RAs.  A Common Gateway Interface (CGI) 
can then be used to start the RA itself. 
3. Modification to Existing Modules 
In order to appropriately bind the remote application to the authenticated user’s 
session, the RAPSKT needs to be associated with the user ID/session level as well as 
with the TRSS and RA.  This allows the RA to find the TRSS that it needs to 
communicate with and to find the RAPSKT that will be used for the communication.  
This binding needs to take place after a user logs into the MLS server, thus, from the 
RAPSKT perspective, the TPS Child Process’s involvement in the RA mechanism is 
RAPSKT Database management. 
The TRSS needs to be started by an existing process.  Since the TPS Child 
Process is created after a user logs into the system, it makes sense for the TPS Child 
Process to create the TRSS. The TRSS then handles remote application requests from the 
user. 
The SSS Parent also now needs to be able to determine if a connection request is 
coming from a remote application or from a user logged into a TPE.  This information 
allows the SSS Parent to correctly determine where packets need to go. 
G. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The following lists the functional requirements that the TRSS, RA, TPS and SSS 
Processes are to provide for RA support on the MLS server: 
Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS): 
• The TRSS shall provide access to the network interface card for RAs by 
performing socket library function calls. 
• The TRSS shall implement a RAPSKT interface used for communications 
between the TRSS and RA. 
• The TRSS shall control requests for connection to peers (i.e., multilevel 




• The TRSS shall assign unique identifiers for each remote connection made 
by the RA and associate it with the user ID/session level, and remove all 
outstanding remote connections after a user logs out or changes session 
levels. 
• A signaling mechanism shall be available for the TRSS to send signals to 
the RA and receive signals from the TPS Child and RA. 
 
Remote Application (RA): 
• The network related functions of the RA shall be modified to use the 
RAPSKT interface only for the MLS LAN side. 
• A Common Gateway Interface (CGI) shall be used to start each RA. 
• A signaling mechanism shall be available for the RA to send signals to the 
TRSS and receive signals from the TRSS. 
Additional Requirements: 
• The TPS Child shall start the TRSS after a user logs in.  The TPS Child 
shall initiate cleanup for the previous session level and start a new TRSS 
when the user changes session levels.  The TPS Child shall initiate 
cleanup when a user logs out. 
• The TPS Child shall assign a RAPSKT Database to be used by the TRSS 
and RAs created for a user ID/session level. 
• The SSS Parent shall be able to verify connections from remote 
application and TPEs. 
• The RA support shall be designed to function with the existing trusted 
code on the MLS server including the Secure Session Server (SSS), the 
Trusted Path Server (TPS) and all related modules summarized in Chapter 
II. 
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IV. REMOTE APPLICATION SUPPORT HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the design process, the high-level design and the reasoning 
behind the various design decisions.  The discussion starts with a description of the 
overall design and the concept of the remote application pseudo-socket (RAPSKT) 
interface.  The chapter continues with a description of the new database modules starting 
with database initialization, moving on to an overview of how the databases are used and 
finishing with a description of each individual database.  The third section of the chapter 
describes the new process modules and the changes to the remote application (RA) 
needed to run a multilevel secure (MLS) server.  The next part of the chapter contains 
details regarding which socket library function calls are supported in the current design.  
Finally, there is a discussion on modifications to pre-existing modules necessary to 
support this design. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Before starting to write the detailed specification, it was first necessary to 
research some background information.  This started with a review of the particulars of 
programming on the XTS-400 in order to determine which system function calls would 
need to be used in the specification.  Some study was necessary to learn the system 
commands on the XTS-400 system as well as the details of writing and compiling 
programs on the system.  Previous research related to the project, including the existing 
design specification for the code currently implemented, was also reviewed. 
The design phase used an iterative process.  The high-level design was first 
written and then several weekly meetings were used to review all high-level design 
decisions being made.  The high-level design was then revised and the meetings 
continued until the high-level design was finalized. 
Following completion of the high-level design, it was time to move on to the low-
level design portion of the specification.  Several modules were written at a time.  After 
review by the design team, there were several meetings to go over any problems with the 
low-level design specification.  This iterative process was continued through all modules.  
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Several times a fundamental problem was found with the high-level design, which made 
it necessary to first revise the high-level design before continuing. 
C. DESIGN OVERVIEW 
The figure below depicts the process structure for remote application (RA) 




Figure 3.   Design Overview 
 
When the system first boots, the Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent Process and 
Secure Session Daemon (SSD) are started.  The SSD then starts a Secure Session Server 
(SSS) for each allowed protocol.  The TPS Parent Process handles login requests from 
users and  creates  a  TPS Child Process to handle trusted path commands from the users  
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 who log in or change session levels.  At this point, the TPS Child Process also starts a 
Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent Process to handle RA requests for a 
particular TPE. 
After a user logs into the system, the user opens a web browser on the client to 
retrieve a web page with the links to start various RAs.  The SSS Parent Process that 
handles HTTP requests creates a SSS Child Process for each connection.  The SSS Child 
Process creates an HTTP daemon (httpd) to service the web request from the user.  The 
httpd communicates with the client via the SSS Child Process, which can access the 
network interface card.  A menu of remote applications is displayed in the web browser.  
After the user selects the RA to be started, a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) program 
starts the execution of the RA Process.  The CGI program responds back to the client’s 
web browser via the httpd with a 204 status code.  This code tells the browser that the 
request succeeded, but that there is no new content.  The SSS Child Process, httpd and 
CGI remain active and wait for additional requests until the connection is terminated or 
timeout is reached.  The RA makes a request to the TRSS Parent Process for socket 
creation.  Finally, the TRSS Parent Process creates a TRSS Child Process to allow the 
RA Process to communicate with the network interface card via the TRSS Child Process. 
A Remote Application Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) mechanism allows 
communications to take place between the TRSS Child Processes and RA Processes.  
Before making a connection with the client, the RA must obtain a RAPSKT from the 
TRSS Parent.  Subsequent socket calls are handled by the TRSS Child.  When the RA 
needs to make a socket library function call using a socket, the function call type and any 
additional parameters for the function call are entered in the RAPSKT Database.  The RA 
then waits for a response from the TRSS Child Process after signaling the TRSS Child 
Process that a function call needs to be handled.  The TRSS Child wakes up and makes 
the socket library function call.  Upon completion the return values are added to the 
RAPSKT Database.  The TRSS Child Process then signals the RA that the function call is 
complete and goes back to sleep.  The TRSS Child Process terminates when all sockets of 




D. NEW DATABASE MODULES 
Six new databases have been added to the design to store the information needed 
by the various processes.  These are the Remote Connection Database, the Remote 
Application Pseudo-Socket Map Database, the Remote Application Pseudo-Socket 
Database, the Peer Level Database, the Source Address Binding Database and the 
Cleanup Database. 
The sections below contain high-level descriptions of the databases.  Additional 
information including module interfaces, constants and the detailed design specification 
itself is included in the detailed design specification. 
1. Database Initialization 
The following table summarizes the location where initialization for each 
database takes place: 
 




Allowed Protocols SSD System-Wide 
(once on system 
startup) 
Y N 
Allowed Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE) 
TPS Parent System-Wide Y N 
Cleanup (*) TPS Parent System-Wide N Y 
Peer Level (*) TPS Parent System-Wide Y Y 
PSKT SSS Child Per TPE User/ 
Session (every 
time a user/session 
is established) 
N Y 
PSKT Map TPS Parent System-Wide N N 
RAPSKT (*) TRSS Parent Per TPE User/ 
Session 
N Y 
RAPSKT Map (*) TPS Parent System-Wide N Y 
Remote Connection (*) TPS Parent System-Wide N Y 
Source Address 
Binding (*) 
TPS Parent System-Wide Y Y 
User TPS Parent System-Wide N Y 
(*) – New Databases     (Italics) – Change From Pre-existing Design 
 
Table 2. Database Initialization Summary 
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Two general rules were used to decide where to place the initialization of each of 
the new databases.  Any system-wide databases not used solely by the SSD would be 
initialized in the TPS Parent Process.  Any databases specific to a user ID/session level 
would be initialized in either the SSS Child Process for servers or TRSS Parent Process 
for RAs.  The SSS Child Process and TRSS Parent Process both handle communications 
for only one user ID/session level.  This changed the location of the initialization of the 
existing PSKT Map Database which originally took place within the SSD process. 
Most databases are stored in shared memory.  The shared memory keys used to 
find the shared memory segments are included in the detailed design specification.  
Statically configured databases are initialized based on administratively-defined data 
stored in read-only files.  The contents of the Source Address Binding Database and Peer 
Level Database do not change during run-time.  The contents of the remaining databases 
are updated during run-time. 
The fact that shared memory is being used requires that the issue of locking be 
examined to prevent the possibility of processes reading inconsistent data.  Locking will 
be discussed below for each individual database.  The Semaphore Module discussed in 
Chapter II is used to implement the locking. 
All databases include a variable which contains the current state of the database.  
This variable prevents processes from accessing the database until initialization is 
complete. 
2. Database Overview 
The figure below shows which databases each process accesses after the system 
has been initialized.  The type of access for each process is also shown in the diagram.  
Additional details regarding specific accesses are provided in the sections that follow.  





Figure 4.   Process / Database Relationships 
 
3. Remote Application Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) Map Database 
The Remote Application Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) Map Database was added to 
keep track of the location of the shared memory segment used for communication 
between the RA Processes and TRSS Processes.  The RAPSKT Map Database maps a 
user ID and session level to a shared memory key which is used to find the shared 
memory segment that contains a Remote Application Pseudo-Socket Database.  The 
TRSS Parent Process identifier is also included with each entry. 
Three processes use this database.  The TPS Child Processes maintain the 
database by assigning a shared memory key to a user ID/session level and a TRSS Parent 
Process identifier when a user logs in or changes session level.  When a user already 
logged into the system logs in again from another client at the same session level, the 
same shared memory key is used.  The TRSS Parent Process and RA Process only have 
read access to the database to find which shared memory key they need to use.  The 
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TRSS Parent Process identifier is used by the TRSS Parent to find the shared memory 
key for the RAPSKT Database described below.  The user and session level fields allow 
the RA Process to find the same RAPSKT Database since the RA Process has no way of 
knowing the TRSS Parent Process identifier.  The TRSS Parent Process identifier also 
allows the TPS Child Process to determine if a TRSS Parent Process has already been 
created for the requested user ID/session level. 
The RAPSKT Map Database requires that a lock be obtained for both reading and 
writing.  The lock prevents two TPS Child Processes from attempting to assign the same 
shared memory key to two different user ID/session levels.  The lock prevents the 
possibility of either the TRSS Parent Process or the RA Process from reading inconsistent 
data if the TPS Child Process is rescheduled before it completes filling in an entry in the 
database. 
4. Remote Application Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) Database 
The RAPSKT Database is included in the design to allow communications 
between the RA Processes and the TRSS Processes.  One instance of the database exists 
for each logged in user ID/session level.  Each entry contains the following fields: call 
type, parameter and data buffer, variable length buffer flag, function return value, error 
number, in use flag, RA Process identifier, TRSS Child Process identifier and RAPSKT 
file descriptor.  The call type field is used to specify the type of socket library function 
call being made by the RA.  This will be described in greater detail in Section F.  The two 
buffers are used to pass the parameters for the socket library function call being made.  In 
some cases, the size of the parameter is too large to fit in the buffer included in the 
database so a dynamically allocated buffer is created to store the data.  The variable 
buffer flag is turned on if the variable length buffer is used.  The function return value 
and error number fields are used by the TRSS Child Process to return the return value for 
a function and the error number resulting from an error respectively.  The in use flag field 
is used to mark RAPSKT Database entries that are currently being used by RAs.  The 
remote application identifier and TRSS Child Process identifier fields are used to store 
the process identifier of the processes using the entry for communications.  Finally, the 
identifying number for the RAPSKT associated with the socket library function call being 
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made is stored in the RAPSKT file descriptor field.  A separate data structure within the 
database is used to manage the RAPSKT file descriptors. 
The TRSS Parent Processes, TRSS Child Processes and RA Processes all have 
read and write access to the database.  The RA Processes use the database to make 
various socket library function calls using the RAPSKT by passing the function call type 
and associated parameters.  Additional information on the supported functions is 
described in another Section F.  The RA Process identifier field allows the RA to find the 
correct entry to use for communications.  The TRSS Parent Process uses the database to 
create a TRSS Child Process for RA making a request for the first time.  The TRSS Child 
Process uses the database to get the parameter for a socket library function call being 
made by a RA Process.  It also uses the database to return the function return value and 
error number if necessary.  The TRSS Child Process identifier field is used by the TRSS 
Child Process to find the entry being used for communications with the RA. 
The RAPSKT Database only requires a locking mechanism for allocation and 
when a RAPSKT is closed or shutdown.  During allocation the lock prevents multiple RA 
Processes and TRSS Child Processes from allocating the same RAPSKT.  The lock for 
closing or shutting down a RAPSKT is necessary because of the way RAPSKT file 
descriptors are handled.  The possibility exists after a fork of the TRSS Child Process that 
the same RAPSKT file descriptor could be used by more than one TRSS Child 
Process/RA Process pair.  Thus it is necessary to ensure that no processes are still using 
the RAPSKT file descriptor before freeing it in the RAPSKT file descriptor array.  
Otherwise, the database requires no additional locking because the database entries used 
by a TRSS Child Process/RA Process pair are not used by any other processes, and the 
TRSS Child Process and RA Process are in lock step.  The TRSS Child Process and RA 
Process signal the other process and wait for a response before continuing their work. 
5. Remote Connection Database 
The Remote Connection Database is used to bind the remote application’s 
connection identifier to a user ID/session level.  This connection identifier consists of the 
source IP address, source port number, destination IP address and destination port 
number.  This binding is necessary for the SSS Parent Process to determine if the 
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connection request came from a RA.  Otherwise, the SSS Parent will just drop the packet 
since it only looks at this database after it checks the User Database. 
Both the TRSS Child Process and SSS Parent Process use the database.  The 
TRSS Child Process adds entries to the database when a RA makes a network connection 
and removes entries from the database when the connection is closed.  The SSS Parent 
Process only has read access and uses the database to check the user ID/session level of a 
remote connection when the connection is not made by a user logged in from a TPE. 
A lock needs to be obtained for both reading from and writing to the Remote 
Connection Database.  Since the database is used to check the user ID/session level of a 
remote connection, the lock is necessary to prevent the possibility of the SSS Parent 
Process reading inconsistent data if the TRSS Child Process does not complete an entry 
in the database before being rescheduled.  It also prevents a remote connection from not 
being found that is in the process of being added to the database or being found that is in 
the process of being removed from the database. 
6. Peer Level Database 
The Peer Level Database is used to keep track of the security level of the peer 
system with which the RA communicates.  A peer system can be either an MLS system 
(e.g., another MYSEA server) or a single-level host.  For single level systems, a field 
indicating the level of the system is also included.  This database provides the means to 
identify whether or not a process will be allowed to communicate with a peer based on 
the level of the RA Process and the level of the peer system.  This information is 
necessary to stop a RA from making a remote connection to a peer at a level not allowed 
by the security policy.  Only the TRSS Child Process requires read access to the database.  
The IP address of the peer is used to retrieve the type of system (single or multi level) and 
level of single level systems. 
The Peer Level Database does not need an additional locking mechanism at this 
point beyond the variable that is used to indicate that database initialization is complete.  
The information in the database comes from a static file and does not change during  
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runtime.  If the database is changed to allow dynamic updating, the locking issue will 
have to be re-examined.  Suggestions for dynamic updates of this database are described 
in Chapter V. 
7. Source Address Binding Database 
The Source Address Binding Database was the last database module added to the 
design after an additional problem was found in the detailed design phase.  Some calls 
such as connect normally bind the socket to any address before the socket library function 
call is made.  However, for the case in which the RA’s peer is another MYSEA server, 
the remote connection identifier needs to be added to the Remote Connection Database so 
that the SSS Parent Process can verify a connection request (resulting from the bind 
operation) if it is not coming from a user logged in with a TPE.  The socket must be 
bound before the remote connection identifier can be added to the Remote Connection 
Database.  Therefore, a method was needed for the TRSS Child to determine which 
source IP address to use for each destination IP address so that the socket can be 
appropriately bound.  This is accomplished in the Source Address Binding Database.  
The TRSS Child Process has read access to the Source Address Binding Database.  A 
destination IP address, to which a network mask is applied, is used to retrieve the source 
IP address. 
The Source Address Binding Database does not need an additional locking 
mechanism since the information in the database comes from a static file and does not 
change during runtime.  If the database were to be changed to allow dynamic updating, a 
locking mechanism would be required.  Suggestions for dynamic update of this database 
are described in Chapter V. 
8. Cleanup Database 
The Cleanup Database is used to keep track of the active SSS Child Processes in 
the system.  This is necessary because the TPS Child Process needs to initiate cleanup 
when a user logs out or changes session levels.  The TPS Child Process already knows 
the process identifier of the TRSS Parent Process that must be killed, but it needs to have 
a way to get a list of SSS Child Processes that are currently running on the system.  Each 
SSS Child Process is associated with a TPE identifier in the Cleanup Database so the TPS 
Child Process can kill all processes associated with a user ID/session level.  The SSS 
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Child Processes add their process identifiers to the database when they are created and 
remove their process identifier when they are terminated. 
The Cleanup Database requires a locking mechanism for both reading and 
writing.  It is important that TPS Child Processes do not read any inconsistent data from 
the database during cleanup since the SSS Child Process identifiers found for the TPE are 
signaled to terminate. 
There is one possible issue with SSS Child Process cleanup which requires more 
work.  In the unlikely occurrence that an SSS Child Process has just been created and the 
TPE logs out or changes session levels before the SSS Child Process identifier can be 
added to the Cleanup Database, the SSS Child Process currently will not be terminated.  
This could potentially cause a resource exhaustion condition to occur due to the presence 
of too many “zombie” processes. 
E. NEW PROCESS MODULES 
Three new processes were added to the existing design: the TRSS Parent Process, 
the TRSS Child Process and the RA Process.  The RA Process runs the RA program that 
has been modified (ported) to use the RAPSKT interface.  This section provides the high-
level details of these processes.  Further information can be found in the detailed design 
specification. 
1. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) 
The TRSS Processes are responsible for handling requests made by the RA 
Processes.  The work is divided between a parent process and multiple child processes. 
a. TRSS Parent Process 
The TRSS Parent Process handles socket requests from new RAs for each 
user at a specific session level.  The following flow diagram shows the high-level flow 




Figure 5.   TRSS Parent Process Flow Diagram 
 
As shown in the diagram, the TRSS Parent Process first attaches to all 
databases that the process needs access to.  The process then gets the shared memory key 
that will be used for the RAPSKT Database from the RAPSKT Map Database.  The 
process uses this key to create and initialize the new RAPSKT Database.  If the user 
ID/session level has already logged into the system from another TPE, the TRSS Parent 
Process will instead attach to a RAPSKT Database which has already been created for the 
other TPE.  Next a named pipe is created to use for signaling for reasons discussed 
below.  A normal signal handler is also setup to capture normal signals from the TPS 
Child Process.  The process then pauses for requests from RA Processes. 
When the TRSS Parent gets a request to create a socket for a new remote 
connection from the RA Process, the TRSS Parent Process locates a RAPSKT database 
entry with the call type set to socket and creates a child process to handle the work of the 
RA.  The TRSS Parent Process then enters the process identifier of the forked process 
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into the RAPSKT Database.  Since the TRSS Parent handles only the first socket function 
call and the TRSS Child Processes conducts all additional socket function calls, there 
needs to be a method for the TRSS Parent Process to differentiate which socket function 
calls in the RAPSKT Database it needs to handle.  Therefore, two different socket call 
type variables were created for this purpose.  After handling the first socket call found, 
the TRSS Parent Process will continue to search the remaining entries in the RAPSKT 
Database and will handle any additional socket calls found. 
The TRSS Parent Process runs at the level of the MLS LAN since the 
children it creates must be forked at that level.  The XTS-400 requires that all processes 
using the MLS LAN network interface card run at this level.  The normal kill signaling 
function call cannot be used by the RA to signal the TRSS Parent since the RA is not 
authorized to signal another process running at a different level.  Therefore, an alternate 
signaling mechanism is needed to avoid having to use polling, which could make the 
processes less efficient.  The chosen method uses named pipes and is described below in 
Section 3 (Synchronization). 
The TRSS Parent Process also needs to have a signal handler to capture 
signals sent using the kill function call.  This handler is necessary to allow the TPS Child 
Process to send a terminate signal to the TRSS Parent Process when a user logs out or 
changes session levels.  When the signal is captured, a flag is set in TRSS Parent module 
data by the signal handler.  If the process was paused when the signal was received, the 
flag is checked immediately after the process is woken up.  The flag is also checked after 
the TRSS Parent Process attempts to find another socket call in the RAPSKT Database 
and after the work for each socket call is complete.  This causes the main processing loop 
of the TRSS Parent Process to exit and cleanup of the module to begin. 
The TRSS Parent Process requires the MAC/DAC exemption and user 
identifier change privileges.  The MAC/DAC exemption privilege is necessary to allow a 
process running at one level to access data at another level.  In the case of the TRSS, both 
TRSS Parent and TRSS Child Processes, running at the level of the MLS LAN, must be 
exempt from MAC/DAC restrictions so that they can access the RAPSKT Database, 
which is associated with a specific user/session level.  The TRSS Parent Process also 
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initializes the RAPSKT Database.  This requires a change in user identifier in addition to 
the MAC/DAC exemption since the TRSS Parent Process is creating the RAPSKT 
Database in shared memory. 
b. TRSS Child Process 
The TRSS Child Process handles all the work for socket library function 
call requests made by the RA Process.  The diagram below shows the high-level process 
flow. 
 
Figure 6.   TRSS Child Process Flow Diagram 
 
When the process initially starts, the process attaches to the necessary 
databases and creates the socket for the RA Process.  The TRSS Child Process then finds 
the entry used in the RAPSKT Database for the initial socket call.  Once the entry is 
found, a named pipe and signal handler are setup as discussed in the TRSS Parent Process 
section above.  The process then waits for a signal from the RA Process.  When the TRSS 
Child Process receives a signal from the RA, the TRSS Child Process checks the call type 
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for each entry in the database.  For any entry found with a valid socket library function 
call, the TRSS Child Process calls the appropriate function handler. 
The TRSS Child Process also must run at the level of the MLS LAN in 
order to allow communications with the TPE.  However, this creates a signaling problem 
between the remote application process and TRSS Child Process.  The same signaling 
mechanism used in the TRSS Parent Process is used for the RA to signal the TRSS Child 
Process.  However, when the TRSS Child Process needs to send a signal back to the RA, 
the normal signaling mechanism can be used because the TRSS Process is authorized to 
signal other processes running at different levels. 
The TRSS Child Process also needs a signal handler to capture 
termination signals.  It functions in the same way as the signal handler in the TRSS 
Parent Process.  The flag set in TRSS Child module data is checked immediately after the 
process wakes up from pausing and after each socket library function call is handled. 
The TRSS Child Process also needs the MAC/DAC exemption privilege 
for the same reason as the TRSS Parent Process. 
2. Remote Application (RA) 
Each client application that runs on the MLS server must have the source code 
modified to use the RAPSKT interface.  Code must be added so that the shared memory 
key for the RAPSKT Database is first obtained from the RAPSKT Map Database so that 
the RA Process can attach to the shared memory.  All network related function calls and 
the fork function call must also be changed to use the interface provided in the RAPSKT 
Module. 
3. Synchronization 
When the TPS Child Process creates a TRSS Parent Process, the new process first 
needs to retrieve the shared memory key that will be used for its RAPSKT Database.  It is 
possible that the TRSS Parent Process may try to retrieve this value before the TPS Child 
Process has a chance to fill in the field in the RAPSKT database.  Therefore, the TRSS 
Parent Process will need to loop until its process identifier can be found in the database or 
until a timeout is reached causing an error. 
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The RA is in lock step with the TRSS Child and Parent Processes.  Whenever the 
RA wants to create its first RAPSKT, the RA Process signals the TRSS Parent Process 
before pausing.  The TRSS Parent Process then creates a TRSS Child Process to handle 
the actual socket function call.  When the RA wants to make some other socket library 
function calls including subsequent socket calls, the RA Process signals the TRSS Child 
Process before pausing.  The RA then waits for a response from the TRSS Processes 
before continuing.  When the TRSS Child Process completes the socket library function 
call, it signals the RA. 
A separate named pipe mechanism is used to send signals from the RA to each 
TRSS Parent Process or TRSS Child Process.  When the TRSS Parent Process starts, the 
TRSS Parent creates a named pipe with a file name appended with its process identifier.  
The TRSS Parent Process then pauses by calling select on the file descriptor of the named 
pipe, waiting for a RA Process to write to the file.  When the RA Process first accesses 
the RAPSKT Database, the RA looks up the named pipe with the TRSS Parent Process 
identifier in the RAPSKT Map Database for a specific user ID/session level and opens it.  
When the RA needs to create its first socket, the RA writes to the named pipe to signal 
the TRSS Parent Process which spawns a TRSS Child Process.  This TRSS Child Process 
creates another named pipe with a file name appended with its process identifier.  The 
RA uses this new named pipe to send any further signals to the TRSS Child Process.  The 
TRSS Child Process uses the normal signal mechanism to signal the RA and uses the 
select call on the file to wait for signals from the RA. 
F. SUPPORTED SOCKET FUNCTIONS 
The table on the next page contains a list of socket library function calls that can 
be made by the RA Process.  In addition there is also a pseudo-fork function 
(rapskt_fork).  This is necessary to emulate the socket property of the fork function call.  
Otherwise, the RAPSKT used for communications would not be copied to the child 
process. 
 There were two choices in the design regarding where to put the actual socket 
calls and policy checking for the various functions.  All of the work could be placed in 
the RAPSKT Module with the TRSS Processes doing nothing except checking for the 
type of call and calling the appropriate handler function in the RAPSKT Module.  The 
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other possibility was to make the RAPSKT Module a means to pass the function 
parameters to the TRSS Processes and then let handlers in the process module do the 
actual socket call and policy checking.  The second option was selected because no 
process other than the TRSS Child Process needs to know about the actual socket since 
only the TRSS Child Process can communicate directly with the network interface card. 
 
Socket Call RAPSKT Call Limitation 
accept rapskt_accept none 
bind rapskt_bind none 
close rapskt_close none 
connect rapskt_connect none 
fcntl rapskt_fcntl Limited command types 
getpeername rapskt_getpeername none 
getsockname rapskt_getsockname none 
getsockopt rapskt_getsockopt none 
ioctl rapskt_ioctl Limited command types. 
listen rapskt_listen none 
read rapskt_read none 
recv rapskt_recv none 
recvfrom rapskt_recvfrom none 
select rapskt_select Only socket file descriptors 
within same RA 
setsockopt rapskt_setsockopt none 
send rapskt_send none 
sendto rapskt_sendto none 
shutdown rapskt_shutdown none 
socket rapskt_socket none 
write rapskt_write none 
 
Table 3. Supported Socket Functions 
 
 The remainder of this section describes the important aspects of the various socket 
library function calls.  A complete description can be found in the detailed design 
specification. 
1. Common Characteristics 
All of the handlers within the TRSS Child Process share a few common steps.  
The function must first retrieve the function parameters from the RAPSKT Database 
using the appropriate database.  The actual socket file descriptor must then be retrieved 
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from module data for all calls except for fork and socket.  Next the actual socket library 
function call can be made.  The handler then writes the function return value and any 
other return values into the RAPSKT Database plus the error number, if the function 
returned an error.  Any return values that are returned in the data buffer do not need to be 
copied since a pointer to the buffer is passed back from the get parameter function.  
Finally, the TRSS Child Process signals the RA Process before pausing for another 
signal.  However, some of these functions require additional steps and checks. 
2. Peer Level Checks 
Any socket library function calls that access a peer must first check the level of 
the peer before allowing the socket library function call to proceed.  The session level of 
the RA Process is compared to the value retrieved from the Peer Level Database.  This 
check is necessary for accept, connect, recvfrom and sendto.  If the peer’s IP address is 
not included in the Peer Level Database, the handler checks to see whether the peer 
happens to be a logged in TPE and then verifies the session level if it is a logged in TPE. 
3. Explicit Binding 
The socket library function calls, which normally would bind the socket to a wild 
card address, if the socket has not already been bound, must first be bound to an address 
retrieved from the Source Address Binding Database.  The reasoning behind this has 
already been explained in the Source Address Binding Database Section D above.  The 
socket library function calls connect and sendto both require this binding. 
4. RAPSKT Database Allocation and Deallocation 
Several of the socket library function calls perform allocation or deallocation of 
RAPSKT Database entries and file descriptors.  The accept and socket function calls need 
to allocate a RAPSKT file descriptor and a new entry in the database.  The close and 
shutdown function calls do the exact opposite; they deallocate the database entry and 
RAPSKT file descriptor.  The handler function in the TRSS Child takes care of the 
allocation for the accept call and the RAPSKT function call made by the RA Process 
takes care of the allocation for the socket call.  The deallocation for the close and 
shutdown function calls also takes place in the RAPSKT Module.  This is necessary 
because the database entry needs to be cleared, but this cannot be done before the return  
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value can be retrieved from the RAPSKT Database by the RA.  The fork function call 
also needs to allocate additional RAPSKT Database entries, but this will be discussed 
below separately. 
5. Remote Connection Updates 
Any socket library function call that either sets up or closes a remote connection 
needs to update the Remote Connection Database.  Both the connect and sendto function 
calls add new entries to the database.  The close and shutdown function calls remove 
entries from the database. 
There is one possible issue remaining which has not yet been solved for sendto.  
The sendto function is normally used for connectionless protocols which do not use close 
or shutdown functions.  Therefore, the TRSS Child Process will not know when to 
remove the remote connection identifiers associated with the sendto function from the 
database.  When the TRSS Child Process terminates, part of the cleanup process involves 
removing all remote connection identifiers that are stored in the TRSS Child’s module 
data.  However, during runtime the TRSS Child Process will not know when the SSS 
Parent Process is finished with the remote connection identifiers, for connectionless 
protocols.  Hence, it is possible that the Remote Connection Database would be filled 
with “zombie” entries while a user is logged into the system.  All Remote Connection 
Database entries related to a TRSS Child Process are removed from the database when 
the process terminates which occurs when a user logs out or changes session levels. 
6. Select 
The select function call requires special handling.  The file descriptors passed as 
parameters are RAPSKT file descriptors and need to be converted before the actual 
socket library call can be made.  After the actual socket call completes, the actual file 
descriptor must also be converted back to the RAPSKT file descriptor.  The handler 
function in the TRSS Child Process performs these conversions. 
This RAPSKT version of select can only be used on sockets and only on the 
sockets in control of one TRSS Child Process.  The normal select function call can be 
used for other file descriptors besides sockets.  Socket file descriptors and other file 
descriptors also cannot currently be combined into one function call, but this is not 
something that would normally be done in a network application. 
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7. Variable Parameters 
The function calls fcntl and ioctl both have a third parameter which could be of 
variable types.  The request parameter for ioctl or the command parameter for fcntl 
determines the variable type of the third parameter.  Thus it is necessary to first check the 
command type before copying the third parameter in and out of the RAPSKT Database.  
For fcntl the third parameter may not even exist so it is also necessary to use a variable 
argument list for copying the parameter into the RAPSKT Database.  The corresponding 
RAPSKT functions for both of these function calls do not currently implement all 
possible command types, but these could easily be added to the design as needed.  The 
supported command types are included in the detailed design specification. 
8. Fork 
The function call fork is the one non-socket function call that needs to be included 
in the RAPSKT interfaces.  The diagram below shows the sequence of events that occurs 
when the RA Process calls the rapskt_fork function. 
 
Figure 7.   Fork Processing Sequence 
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This sequence is necessary in order to duplicate the RAPSKTs currently used in 
the original RA Process in the new RA Process.  The RA Process forks first before 
signaling the TRSS Child Process to handle the duplication.  The RA Process also saves 
the new process identifier in the RAPSKT Database so that the TRSS Child Process 
knows how to fill in the RA Process identifier field in the RAPSKT Database for new 
entries.  When the TRSS Child Process receives the signal, it first forks a new TRSS 
Child Process which waits for a signal from the original TRSS Child Process.  The 
original TRSS Child Process does the duplication by using an interface in the RAPSKT 
Module including setting the RA Process identifier and TRSS Child Process identifier 
fields to the values of the new forked processes.  The original TRSS Child Process also 
sets the function return value field in the first RAPSKT Database entry for each 
RA/TRSS Child pair.  Each TRSS Child Process then signals the RA Process that they 
will communicate with after the original TRSS Child Process completes the duplication 
and signals the new TRSS Child Process. 
G. CHANGES TO EXISTING MODULES 
The main changes to the existing modules are detailed below.  In general, the 
cleanup processing within the TPS Child and Parent Processes, SSS Child and Parent 
Processes and SSD Process have been improved.  Some additional work may still be 
required in this area.  Further information is available in the detailed design specification. 
1. TPS Parent Process / SSD 
The initialization of the PSKT Map Database has been moved to the TPS Parent 
Process from the SSD.  Another change is the enabling of the MAC/DAC exemption 
privilege.  The TPS now cleans up any left over PSKT Databases and needs to be at the 
same level as each PSKT Database before this can be done.  This clean up used to occur 
in the SSD in the pre-existing design. 
2. TPS Child Process / SSS Child Process 
Two main changes occurred in the TPS Child Process.  Allocation of a PSKT 
handle is now the responsibility of the TPS Child Process, not the SSS Child Process.  
The TPS Child Process must now create a TRSS Parent Process to handle RA requests.  
Before creating the new process, the TPS Child Process first ensures that a TRSS Parent 
Process does not already exist for a user ID/session level. 
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3. SSS Parent Process 
The SSS Parent checks the user ID/session level of a TPE when it receives a 
packet.  Now when the TPE identifier cannot be found in the User Database, the SSS 
Parent will also try to find the remote connection identifier in the Remote Connection 
Database to get the user ID/session level. 
4. User Database 
One additional interface has been added to the User Module.  This new interface 
allows the TPS Child Process to determine if a user ID/session level is logged in from 
any TPE.  This interface is used during cleanup by the TPS Child Process.  Since the 
same TRSS Child Process is used by all TPEs associated with the same user ID/session 
level, the TRSS Child Process is only terminated if a user ID/session level has logged out 
from all TPEs. 
The TRSS Child Process now also has read access to the database.  The TRSS 
Child uses the database to determine the security level of a peer that is not included in the 
Peer Level Database.  This can occur if the peer is a logged in TPE. 
H. SUMMARY 
The top level design for RA support and the methodology used for the design 
have been presented.  All databases and processes necessary to provide the support have 
been described.  The socket library function calls supported have been presented and the 
changes to existing modules summarized.  The next chapter will present possible future 















V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses some possibilities for future work and presents the final 
thoughts on the project.  A detailed design specification is a living document and there is 
always room for improvement.  Several suggestions are given below for improvements to 
the design.  A few ideas are also listed for testing the source code after programming is 
complete. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Programming and Testing 
The design specifications created for the remote application support contain 
sufficient detail that a prototype can be quickly implemented.  The testing of this 
implementation is also challenging because of the complexity of the RAPSKT library. 
a. Code Testing 
The test plan for the source code should include both testing for the 
individual modules and testing for the overall remote application support.  The latter can 
be achieved by porting a remote application.  However, the means to provide remote 
application I/O support on the client are currently limited.  Currently, only a web browser 
interface is available for the MYSEA user to access read-only data on the MYSEA 
server.  Eventually a network-based windowing system, such as X Windows, could be 
ported to allow the remote applications to redirect its input and output to the MYSEA 
client.  Meanwhile a simpler testing scheme should be used to test the remote application 
support. 
Several testing ideas have been discussed as the design progressed.  The 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) client program could be used for the test 
application.  An open source TFTP client program would be ported to use the RAPSKT 
interface.  The modifications to the TFTP client would allow the TFTP client to get a file 
from the TFTP server running on the MYSEA client.  The user would start the TFTP 
client remotely from the MYSEA client by selecting the appropriate option presented by 
the CGI program in the web browser as discussed in Chapter IV.  Unfortunately the 
TFTP client program does not exercise all of the socket function calls currently supported 
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by the RAPSKT interface.  Therefore, additional remote applications or other test code 
would be required to test all the RAPSKT functions. 
b. Stress Testing 
The Source Address Database, the Peer Level Database, the RAPSKT 
Map Database, the PSKT Map Database, the PSKT Database, the RAPSKT Database, the 
User Database, the Remote Connection Database and the Cleanup Database are all 
accessed by more than one process.  Some testing may be required to determine if there 
are any bottlenecks in the system.  There should not be any issues with the Source 
Address Binding Database and the Peer Level Database because no locking is required 
after initialization is complete, but the remaining databases could be potential problems 
because locking is required during runtime. 
2. Design Improvements 
Some design decisions were made to simplify implementation and testing of the 
initial prototype.  This section contains some suggested changes which could be added to 
the project in future work.  However, eventually it will be necessary to prove that the 
trusted code functions correctly.  Adding more complexity to the design increases the 
difficulty doing this proof for the trusted code. 
a. Configurable Databases 
The database modules all currently have a static size which can be 
changed by modifying the system wide constants that define the maximum size of each 
database.  However, in the future, the databases should be modified to allow the 
maximum size to be configured by an administrator.  These databases should never be 
allowed to grow dynamically because of the complexity that would be added to the 
trusted code. 
b. Source Address Binding Database/Peer Level Database 
Both the Source Address Binding Database and Peer Level Database are 
loaded into shared memory during initialization from administratively set files.  There is 
currently no way to modify these databases during runtime.  An interface could be added 
to each module to allow a new version of the database to be loaded without having to 
reboot the system.  Each database would need to be locked while being updated.  In 
addition, the Peer Level Database could be modified to allow IP address ranges in order 
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to better handle access to a range of single level hosts.  Otherwise, there would need to be 
a large number of entries in the database to handle all allowed host addresses. 
c. RAPSKT Map Database/PSKT Map Database 
A covert channel storage currently exists in the RAPSKT Map Database 
and PSKT Map Database.  The remote applications currently all have access to the same 
RAPSKT Map Database in order to determine which RAPSKT Database that they need 
to use for communications with the appropriate TRSS Child Process.  The same applies 
for the PSKT Map Database that is used by the application protocol servers to determine 
which PSKT Database that the APS Processes need to use for communications with the 
appropriate SSS Child Process.  One possible solution to mitigate this risk is to partition 
the collective map into multiple maps, one for each security level. 
d. Cleanup 
There are currently two potential cleanup problems.  The problem 
concerning the existence of SSS Child “zombie” processes has already been discussed in 
Chapter IV.  In addition the TRSS Child Process normally signals the remote application 
process to terminate, but it is possible that a user might be able to log out or change 
session levels before a TRSS Child Process can be created.  Therefore, the remote 
application process would never receive the signal to terminate.  Both of these events 
should be rare, if they ever occur, but pose a difficult problem that will take considerable 
design work. 
e. Remote Connection Database 
There is also an issue with “zombie” entries in the Remote Connection 
Database resulting from the fact that the TRSS Child Process will not know when to 
remove the remote connection identifiers associated with the sendto function from the 
database as discussed in Chapter IV.  However, this problem has a limited effect since all 
Remote Connection Database entries related to a TRSS Child Process are removed from 
the database when a user logs out or changes session levels. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis proposes a design for remote client-side application support on the 
MYSEA server.  A new TRSS Process family has been proposed to accept remote 
connection requests for remote applications and perform the actual function calls related 
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to the socket.  A RAPSKT interface has been proposed to provide the communications 
interface between the TRSS Process and the remote application.  The RAPSKT interface 
limits the number of changes required in the remote application.  The number of new 
trusted processes has been limited by placing all new trusted code necessary for remote 
application support within the TRSS Process.  This allows the remote applications to 
remain untrusted. 
The design has been divided into well-defined modules.  The RAPSKT Module 
manages the RAPSKT interface.  The Remote Connection Module keeps track of the 
current socket connections for remote applications.  The RAPSKT Map Module keeps 
track of the RAPSKT Database shared memory keys allocated to different user/session 
level.  The data for peer IP addresses and their associated session level are managed by 
the Peer Level Module.  The Source Address Binding Module manages the data that 
determines which source IP address to use for each destination IP address for sockets that 
need to be specifically bound.  The TRSS Module accepts and handles remote 
connections requests from the remote applications. 
This remote application support enhances the usability of the MYSEA MLS 
network by providing the much needed capability for MYSEA clients to run remote 
applications on the MYSEA MLS server over the MYSEA MLS LAN.  This support 
provides the MYSEA user the ability to use server-resident client-side applications on the 
MYSEA server to access data at different security levels. 
Continued research on the MYSEA project could have far reaching benefits for 
future military and Department of Defense (DoD) transformation initiatives that require a 
high-level of information assurance.  This could include initiatives such as the Global 
Information Grid (GIG), FORCEnet or Homeland Defense. 
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APPENDIX DESIGN SPECIFICATION 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) Multilevel Security (MLS) Local 
Area Network (LAN) design specification document is an internal document containing 
sufficient detail to develop a prototype for the Trusted Path Server (TPS), Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE), Secure Session Daemon (SSD), Secure Session Server (SSS), Trusted 
Remote Session Server (TRSS), and supporting modules described in Chapters II and IV.  
The information in the design specification includes a list of constants (Section 3), a 
high-level description of the database and process modules (Sections 4 and 5), a 
description of the interfaces for each module (Section 6), and a detailed implementation 
specification for each module (Section 9).  Appendix A of the design specification 
contains the C-language definition of the RAPSKT database. 
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